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The Shah's Secret Police Are Here

By Gregory F. Rose

"...SAVAK agents operate with impunity in America, watching and harassing Iranian dissidents and opponents of the regime..."

The sidewalk in front of the Iranian Embassy looked like a cops' convention: people from District of Columbia Metropolitan Police, United States Park Police, Federal Protection Service, Secret Service—one moment talking, joking, the next glancing nervously down Massachusetts Avenue to the line of Washington cops, three men deep, between them and the Iranian student demonstrators. A SWAT team, in their blue fatigues, lolled beside their van across from the building that is Brazil's consular annex.

"Shah is a U.S. puppet. Down with the shah," 60 demonstrators chanted with a rhythmic monotony. Less fierce than weary from their trek from Lafayette Park to the police line 500 feet from the embassy, the only danger afforded the massed officers was, perhaps, sunstroke.

As the demonstration ended, the students rolling up their banners for another time and making their way in

Gregory F. Rose has written for Politics Today and National Review. His novel, Neither Fear Nor Courage, will be published next year.

small clusters for home, the embassy garrison relaxed.

Suddenly a blue, Checker-like sedan—D.C. license DPL 4138—pulled from Massachusetts Avenue into the embassy drive. The doors swung open and four men, one in a white suit, emerged. A bodyguard scanned the street across from the embassy and, seeing a photographer, grabbed the white-suited man, whirling him around, his back to the street. He moved quickly, back still to the camera, from the drive to the ambassador's private entrance at the side of the embassy residence. As he reached the doorway, an Iranian emerged, breathless, from the residence. They conferred, the white-suited man taking a sheaf of papers from his briefcase. A moment later, the second man dashed for a waiting embassy car. With two more steps the white-suited man was in the residence. Moments later the police supervisors arrived. They, too, entered the residence through the ambassador's private door.

The man in the white suit was Mansur Rafizadeh. As chief of station, he heads SAVAK, the shah's secret police,

and its operations in the United States.

SAVAK—the Persian acronym for the National Information and Security Organization—has a sinister reputation. International organizations, including Amnesty International, have repeatedly scored SAVAK for the repression and even torture of dissidents in Iran. Some knowledgeable Western observers have gone so far as to claim that SAVAK maintains greater control over the lives of most Iranians than does the KGB over citizens in the Soviet Union.

A pattern of SAVAK's torture and execution of political prisoners, censorship of the press, denial of due process, and surveillance of suspected opponents has been established by international human-rights monitoring groups. While the Iranian government asserts that there are fewer than 1,000 political prisoners in all Iran, SAVAK's deputy director, Parviz Sabeti, has told Western reporters that 1,000 political prisoners are held in one prison alone, just outside the city of Isfahan, and that SAVAK maintains dozens of prisons around the country. The best estimate

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of the number of officers and informants SAVAK maintains in Iran is 20,000. Sabeti would admit to 3,500 to 4,000; Prime Minister Hoveida claimed 2,500. The shah would admit to 1,500. SAVAK's true strength, like the fate of many of its prisoners, is a mystery.

For a country in which the apparatus of repression is so well developed, Iran has a vigorous if largely clandestine opposition.

The opposition runs the gamut of extreme left to extreme right, with the majority falling in the camp of conservative Moslems disturbed by Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi's "White Revolution," a complex of modernization and economic-development measures that has created serious social and economic dislocation in Iran.

State Department experts have maintained in congressional testimony that the Pahlevi dynasty could collapse without the massive infusion of United States military technology which a 25-year relationship between the CIA-Defense Department and the shah has spawned. It is, in part, for this reason that the shah and his secret police have shown considerable interest in the opposition leaders and students in exile in the United States, and that opposition figures have frequently alleged that SAVAK has operated against them within American borders.

Extensive investigation has disclosed that SAVAK and its agents (known in intelligence circles as "SAVAKs") are operating with impunity in the United States. Among the allegations are:

□ The payment of \$1 million from the shah's private Swiss bank account by SAVAK to President Richard Nixon's Committee to Re-elect the President in early 1974.

□ The use of prostitutes and drugs at parties attended by members of Congress.

□ An extensive campaign of surveillance and harassment of Iranian dissidents and American opponents of the shah in this country.

Many of these operations have been undertaken with the tacit approval of the CIA, and, while Attorney General Griffin Bell has since early this year attempted to increase FBI attention to violations of United States law by foreign intelligence services, they continue with little effort by American authorities to put a halt to them.

The Recruiting of Unwilling Agents

Wallace: *We turned to the shah's secret police force, his FBI and CIA combined. They are called SAVAK, and they have a reputation for brutality. He acknowledged that he has SAVAK agents on duty in the United States... And they are there for the purpose of checking up on Iranian students?*

Shah: *Checking up on anybody who becomes affiliated with circles, organizations hostile to my country, which is the role of any intelligence organization.*

— "The Shah of Iran," 60 Minutes,
October 24, 1976

Ahmed looks older than his nearly 30 years. His forehead is deeply creased and his hair, already thinning, has begun to gray. His eyes, moist with fear, scan the restaurant where we meet. He has good reason to be afraid: He is one of hundreds of Iranians who have spied for SAVAK on Iranians and Americans alike in the United States, and he fears for his life if SAVAK learns that he has talked.

"I was recruited by SAVAK in Tehran," Ahmed begins, lighting another cigarette from the one he just finished. "I was arrested in a mosque for taking a leaflet that criticized the shah. After that, I lost my job. For months I would be fired from a job days after I was hired. No explanation was ever given. I wanted to leave the country, to come to America to find work, but they wouldn't give me a passport. They pointed to my record. I was practically penniless. Finally, SAVAK called me in and one of their officers said, 'You want to go to America? Good. We will see that you get to America. But you

must help us.' He told me that I must spy on Iranian students in America. I didn't have any choice.

"When I got to America, I took a job as a waiter in an expensive restaurant. I reported to Mansur Rafizadeh at the embassy. Officially he works at the United Nations, but he is really a powerful SAVAK. When he wanted to see me, the embassy would call. A man would only say, 'Come to the embassy.' And I would go."

Ahmed can barely control his anger when he speaks of Rafizadeh. "He is an animal, a pig. He cares for nothing. I have heard agents beg him to leave them alone. They begged him and still he made them work for him. Once I knew a man and his wife who went to the embassy to tell Rafizadeh that he wouldn't work for him anymore. Rafizadeh sent the man downstairs and then tried to rape his wife. Rafizadeh is an animal. He cares for nothing."

Ahmed was used primarily to inform on Iranian students' groups opposed to the shah. He reports a well-organized campaign to infiltrate and disrupt these organizations with a chilling sophistication. "It was my duty to report on the student groups. SAVAK sometimes told you what to say. They would give you a line that you were to say only after you heard another line said. It was funny to be in the radical groups' meetings. I remember one time I had my line to say, after I heard someone else say his. Suddenly, the worst anti-regime, radical, hot-tempered Communist student stood up and shouted. And I realized that he had said the line I was waiting for. He was a SAVAK. It took me totally by surprise."

Often, Ahmed relates, these pre-arranged scripts included provocations aimed at inciting violence. SAVAK would use any such violence to persuade local U.S. authorities to take action against the student leaders.

At times, Ahmed was required to travel to New York on SAVAK's orders. "Once I was sent to New York to cover a huge gathering of Iranian students. I went with an Iranian woman from San Francisco. She was a SAVAK too. We flew to New York from Washington and stayed there in a college dormitory. We attended the meetings all day, taking notes on who said what, and reported in the evening to Rafizadeh at a safe-house apartment in the East Eighties. That night, some of the students thought they recognized the woman who had come with me. They

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found notes in her room. The whole place went into a frenzy. 'Search every room,' they shouted. I had to get to my room quickly. My notes were hidden in my suitcase, and I had to get to them before they did. I ran like you couldn't believe and went into my room and shut the door. I didn't know what to do. I tried to sneak out, but I heard them coming down the hall. I finally burned my notes in an ashtray and scattered them on the rug. Suddenly the students burst in. I didn't have any notes, but they smelled the smoke—there was a lot of it—and were suspicious. I tried to explain that I had accidentally set the rug on fire with a

cigarette. Just then some other students caught the woman SAVAK. They ran out of my room to question her. They beat her badly. She was almost killed."

Ahmed's other targets included United States government and business figures who dined at the restaurants where he worked. He reports a network of Iranian waiters and restaurant owners in Washington, D.C., who work as SAVAK informers. "Every week a SAVAK officer comes in and sits at your table. He asks if you need any money or other help. Then he asks if you've overheard anything interesting. Colonel Farivari runs this network. He is a very big SAVAK at the embassy.

He keeps files on Iranians in Washington."

SAVAK's attempts to recruit informants like Ahmed have often been directed at Iranian students already enrolled in American colleges. Between 22,000 and 50,000 Iranians attend U.S. schools, and the shah's policy of heavily endowing many of these institutions has raised questions as to the degree to which American universities have entered into tacit agreements to police Iranian students as a condition of funding. Published reports of the Reza Zanjani case highlight the dangers of collusion that these endowments present.



Security:
Farzaneh sees
that SAVAK
operations stay
undercover.



Politics:
Ghoushbeigui
keeps tabs on
U.S. politicians.



Visas: Kazemian
maintains a list
of Iran's friends
and enemies.

SAVAK Agents Operating in the United States

Through various sources an inside view of SAVAK's spy apparatus in the United States has been obtained. This information has been checked with former SAVAKs, well-placed Western journalists, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffers, and State Department and FBI sources. Nothing has been included for which cross-confirmation was not obtained.

SAVAK in the United States is headed by Mansur Rafizadeh, officially an attaché in the Iranian Mission to the United Nations. Sources describe him as ruthless and calculating, an operator who plays on his subordinates' fears and vices to retain his grasp on SAVAK's network. Wary of public exposure, Rafizadeh has been known to use a double to attend many embassy functions.

Rafizadeh chairs SAVAK's Security Committee in the United States, a body that sets priorities and supervises operations throughout the country. Other members of this Security Committee include Ahmad Moshavegh-Zadeh, a political counselor of the embassy in D.C.; Mohammad Farzaneh, an embassy attaché; and Farouk Parsi and Bahmen Esfandiri, both of the U.N. Mission.

At the Iranian Embassy in D.C. the SAVAK station is organized into four sections: financial, press liaison and dissident-groups surveillance, political liaison, and visa clearance.

The financial section handles payments to SAVAK agents and, sources allege, U.S. politicians, including some members of Congress. It consists of Youssef Akbar, head of the embassy's economic and petroleum section; Colonel A. A. Farivari, who handles most payments to agents and informants; and Malektaj Javan, an embassy secretary.

The press-liaison and dissident-groups-surveillance section is responsible for monitoring the United States press

for any comment on Iran and keeping tabs on Iranian dissidents, especially students, and American opponents of the shah. This section is headed by Manoutchehr Ardalan, press-and-information-affairs counselor. He is assisted by Nasrollah Soltani and Farhad Vakil.

Congress and the White House are the main targets of the political-liaison section, headed by Nasser Ghoushbeigui, a political counselor. Other targets include the Departments of Energy, Commerce, and the Treasury. Ghoushbeigui is assisted in these operations by Zahed Dadash-Rashidi and Abdol K. Adibpour.

The visa-clearance section is headed by Dr. Gholam Kazemian, the embassy's minister for cultural affairs. Sources report that he retains a list of United States citizens who are to be refused visas to Iran and Iranian nationals whose passports are not to be renewed. Whenever an American citizen requests a visa at the embassy or one of the Iranian consulates, his or her name must be checked against Kazemian's list. Kazemian is assisted by Anoushirvan Ashraf, cultural-affairs counselor.

Each of the Iranian consulates has a SAVAK base, controlled by the Security Committee.

At the consulate in New York, the SAVAK base is headed by Parsi and Esfandiri. Other SAVAKs stationed here are Zia Niaverani and Mokhtar Saed, both attached to the U.N. Mission, and Mohammad-Reza Modjtahedzadeh, a vice-consul.

In Houston, the Iranian consulate shelters SAVAK officers Hossein Haji-Jafari and Hamid Parviz, both vice-consuls.

The consulate in Chicago is the base of operations for SAVAKs Abbas Sharifi Tehrani and Mohammad Ali Izadi-Seradj.

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Zanjanifer, an otherwise apolitical George Washington University student, was photographed by SAVAK at his first and only demonstration in March 1976. In August of that year, his faculty adviser, Professor Philip D. Grub, an American, informed Zanjanifer on behalf of the Iranian Embassy that his scholarship was being canceled. Grub's role as embassy messenger was characterized by university officials as "unheard of." However, as Ayramehr professor of multinational management, Grub owed his chair to the shah's endowment and boasted of his Iranian-cabinet connections.

Anonymous phone calls followed cancellation of Zanjanifer's scholarship. The callers said: "If you want to be 'forgiven,' write in detail the names of your friends, any meetings you may have gone to, the people you saw there." Zanjanifer refused. The calls continued. "If you want your scholarship reinstated, you must work for SAVAK, you must infiltrate student groups at GWU and report on them." Again he refused. SAVAK tried to reach him three more times over the next two months. Zanjanifer refused.

That SAVAK is actively recruiting informants to compromise anti-regime dissidents in the United States is a fact. However, certain SAVAK documents obtained by Iranian students occupying the Iranian consulate in Geneva point to break-ins of dissidents' homes as another universally applied SAVAK technique.

One document, tagged "confidential," is a cable from SAVAK headquarters to Geneva ordering:

Clandestine entries to opposition homes should be preceded by an operations plan (such as complete information on the subject, location of his or her residence, time of his or her leaving home and returning, emergency avenues of exit in case of unpredictable incidents, etc.). Please instruct your officers that in any future case of clandestine entry of an opposition residence, the full plan must be forwarded to headquarters for approval.

It was signed by Parviz Sabeti, SAVAK's deputy director, and was accompanied by two pages of detailed instructions on copying keys using a substance called "Plastilin," molding new keys, and various tools for opening locks. This document concluded, "If you send us pictures of different locks and keys, or sample keys, more guidance will be given."

These documents also corroborate Ahmed's allegations about SAVAK's use of agents provocateurs against dis-

sident groups. A cable labeled "Top Secret," signed by Deputy Sabeti, declares: "You must intensify these differences [between dissident student groups] by all possible means with an aim to provoking some severe actions against each other." Another cable instructs all SAVAK bases to acquire information on "demonstrations of dissident Iranians, strikes, students' calls to imperial embassies and consulates, holding of meetings, publishing of publications, conventions and seminars, and activities of pro-government students." Reports were to be transmitted by diplomatic courier to Tehran.

Professor Richard Cottam, an Iranian specialist at the University of Pittsburgh and former foreign-service officer in Tehran, says of these documents, "Although they were gathered in Geneva, they bear markings which indicate their applicability to all SAVAK stations. Their authenticity is unquestionable."

The extent of SAVAK's surveillance and harassment operations in the United States is suggested by a set of events in upstate New York in late 1976. Alerted to the purchase by Iranians of farmland near Boonville, Iranian dissidents went to the farm to find what its owners called "the world's largest dairy barn" under construction. The purchasers of the farm, Mansur's Farms, Inc., included Houshang Namvar Tehrani, identified as a New Jersey pharmacist. Tehrani was also Mansur Rafizadeh's brother-in-law. Reza Baraheni, an Iranian dissident poet and novelist, is said to have told U.S. Senate investigators in April 1977 that he believed Tehrani was one of the SAVAK investigators who tortured him in an Iranian prison. Iranian dissidents asserted that SAVAK had purchased the Boonville farm for a "torture cen-

ter" in the United States. There was no corroboration at the time for these allegations.

Now, however, former SAVAKs and United States government sources have disclosed the story behind the Boonville-farm affair. These sources report that Tehrani bought the farm with SAVAK money provided by Rafizadeh. It was to have served as SAVAK's U.S.-Canadian operations center, housing computerized files on Iranians in America and Iranians and American opponents of the shah, as well as a communications center to connect SAVAK's bases with SAVAK headquarters in Tehran. Preliminary contact was made with Rockwell International to obtain electronic equipment critical to the facility (a Rockwell spokesman refused comment). When the farm's existence was reported in the press, Tehran vetoed the operation.

Entertaining Key Congressmen

"Christ, if you think Koreagate's bad, just hope they never start poking around in Tehran."

—House ethics-committee staffer

For months rumors of sex and opium available to select VIP's at Ambassador Ardesir Zahedi's Massachusetts Avenue residence have bounced around the Washington cocktail circuit. These stories were attributed by many to Zahedi's reputation as an international swinger.

However, it has been learned that many of these parties were in fact organized by Manoutchehr Ardalan, officially the embassy's press-and-information counselor, who has been identified by numerous sources as a senior officer of SAVAK's Washington

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station. Other senior SAVAKs attended these parties where, witnesses report, members of Congress engaged in activities which could well be characterized as seriously compromising.

"It was like something out of *The Arabian Nights*," recalls a member of the embassy's staff, witness to one such party at the embassy residence in October 1977. "There would be caviar in crystal bowls on the tables around the room and wine and liquor. After an hour or so of socializing, Zahedi would call to his bodyguard, who would bring out an opium pipe and hashish. Everyone would sit on pillows in a circle and pass the pipes around. After a while, Zahedi would tell one of the women there—they were mainly prostitutes; Ardalan procured them but some of them were female embassy employees—to dance. She would strip in the center of the room while the Iranians and their guests watched and shouted obscenities. When she had finished, the men would fall on the women and f---k with them for the rest of the night. Zahedi is a man without culture, without humanity."

Among the SAVAKs who attended these orgies were Mansur Rafizadeh, Manoutchehr Ardalan, Nasser Ghoushbeigui, and Gholam Kazemian. A witness places an eastern senator and a midwestern congressman as other participants.

"At one of the parties I attended, I saw Congressman X. He was the guest of honor and sat next to Zahedi," this source reports. "He didn't smoke the opium, but he shared some hashish with Zahedi's bodyguard. Zahedi paraded the women in front of the congressman and gave him the first choice. He chose one of the Iranian women. I watched them have sex."

"At another party I saw Senator Y smoke opium with Zahedi. Later in the evening I saw him making love with two of the prostitutes." The congressman and the senator, for their part, have both denied the allegations.

Other sources, independently approached, have confirmed this account.

A bizarre set of events occurred while this article was being checked.

Two hours after this reporter spoke to Congressman X, one of the sources—an embassy officer—called the magazine, said that the embassy was aware of the story and that a senior SAVAK officer had called an 8:30 meeting the following morning at the embassy to deal with the situation. The source begged this reporter never to contact him again and hung up. Other sources around SAVAK have independently confirmed that SAVAK informants were being asked if they had been contacted by this reporter. A call to the senior SAVAK at 8:30 the next morning revealed that he was in a meeting and could not be disturbed.

One week later, Manoutchehr Ardalan—the SAVAK who is said to have procured prostitutes for Congressman X and Senator Y—was suddenly appointed consul general in San Francisco after five years at the Washington embassy. A source close to Ardalan's wife reports her saying, "This has happened so fast we've had no time to pack." Ten days later they were gone. It is not possible to determine whether the sudden transfer is directly connected to this magazine's investigation, but such haste is not usual.

The danger posed by alleged participation of members of Congress in these Iranian Embassy sex-and-drug parties is political rather than moral. At the very least their activities open them to compromise by SAVAK. The use of sexual favors, entrapment, and blackmail have been long favored by intelligence services as means of recruiting agents, especially agents of influence.

Both the senator and the congressman have been firm proponents of Iranian-supported legislation, as their voting records on the floor and in committee show. It is reasonable to question whether a relationship can be inferred from their participation in these parties and their voting records on matters dear to SAVAK and the shah.

However, evidence of graver SAVAK tampering with the American political process has been obtained—evidence which points to the buying of the support of a president of the United States by the shah and his secret police.

In early 1974 a SAVAK operation transported \$1 million from the shah's private Swiss bank account to the Committee to Re-elect the President—Nixon—via a Mexico City bank. A telegram from Geneva banking sources confirms that this transfer from Geneva to Mexico City occurred.

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A participant described the operation this way:

"In February or March 1974, a million dollars was transferred from the shah's account at the Schweizerische Bankgesellschaft to the Banco de Londres y Mexico in Mexico City. [Iranian] Ambassador Amir-Aslan Afshar, who was then ambassador to Mexico as well as the United States, went down to pick it up. A member of his staff who accompanied him brought the money up to the embassy in Washington in the diplomatic pouch. Afshar counted the money himself in his office and then put it in a suitcase. He and his bodyguard drove to the Committee to Re-elect the President and gave it to officials. I don't know precisely who."

A witness reports that when Ambassador Afshar recounted this story to a group of Iranians at the embassy, he added, tellingly, "Now we own Nixon."

The CIA's Special Relationship

"We do not make agreements for their [SAVAK's] activities in our country."

—CIA Director Stansfield Turner,
March 9, 1977

"There is a tacit agreement between our two governments about our operations here and yours in my country. On the basis of a 1959 bilateral security agreement between Iran and the United States, we are obligated to exchange information regarding the national security interests of both parties. . . . Your CIA has been very helpful in these matters."

—Manoutchehr Ardalan, Iranian Embassy press-and-information counselor, July 26, 1978

The shah's matter-of-fact admission to Mike Wallace in October of 1976 that SAVAK operates in the United States with the knowledge and consent of the United States government touched off a controversy which left a secretary of state, a State Department spokesman, and a director of the CIA looking very much like liars.

At an October 27 press conference, a grave Henry Kissinger, then secretary of state, responded, "It is not correct that the United States is aware of the fact that Iranian intelligence personnel are checking on individuals living in the United States or keeping them under surveillance." He announced that a State Department investigation of Iranian activities would be undertaken.

Twelve days later, Alfred L. Ather-

ton Jr., assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, paid a visit to Ambassador Zahedi to inform Zahedi that the United States would tolerate no illegal activities by SAVAKs in the United States. A State Department spokesman reported the next day that no evidence had been found to confirm "allegations of any illegal or improper activity and the Iranian embassy has assured us that none of its officials are committing any such activities." Official explanation: The shah had made a mistake. Case closed.

While a request under the Freedom of Information Act for a copy of the Kissinger report was denied by State Department officials, new documentary evidence of State Department and other United States-agency collusion with the Iranian government in an operation against a United States citizen was obtained.

Nasser Afshar, a United States citizen since the early 1950s, is an Iranian dissident, the publisher of the *Iran Free Press*. Documents he has won through a Freedom of Information Act suit establish State Department cooperation with SAVAK at the time Henry Kissinger was secretary of state.

One document labeled "confidential" is a cable from the United States Embassy in Tehran to the secretary of state, dated May 1973, three years prior to Kissinger's denial. It requests further information for transmission to the Iranian government on the issuance of a passport to Afshar. Four paragraphs of the cable were deleted.

The remainder reads:

5. DCM [deputy chief of mission] said that embassy was generally aware of Afshar's activities in U.S., including *Iran Free Press*, and agreed that Afshar's performance was scandalous and his efforts to mount anti-Iranian campaign in U.S. extremely unfortunate. In fact in last two years embassy had several times raised with Department question whether *Iran Free Press* could be closed down. Matter had been carefully studied but lawyers had concluded that under U.S. laws there was regrettably no basis for such action. As for U.S. passport, embassy was not informed on this aspect of case and would ask Department for full report.

6. FYI embassy files include message (Tehran 2932, Jan. 19, 1967) indicating Afshar had U.S. passport in 1967. End FYI.

7. Comment: In dredging up this case it occurs to us that GOI [government of Iran] is putting

us on notice and indirectly suggesting that we tidy up as much as possible anti-Shah elements in U.S. to reduce or avoid untoward incidents or anti-Shah demonstrations during his forthcoming visit to U.S.

8. Action requested: All relevant information on circumstances leading to issuance of U.S. passport to Afshar which we can pass to GOI.

The document was sent by Richard Helms, the U.S. ambassador and former CIA director.

The involvement of other agencies is suggested by the routing instructions which appear at the top of the cable. Copies were sent to the CIA, Department of Defense, National Security Agency, the United States Information Agency, and the National Security Council.

Sources report that this "special relationship" between U.S. government agencies and SAVAK continues to the present. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the CIA's continuing liaison with the Iranian service.

Since SAVAK's inception in 1936, the CIA has trained, equipped, and advised SAVAK officers.

A State Department spokesman confirmed that 175 SAVAKs are currently undergoing training at the CIA's McLean, Virginia, facilities. This is down from the last five years' average of 400 per year. CIA officials refused to comment.

Some sensitivity to the dangers SAVAK operations in the United States present can be found in the Department of Justice. Senior Justice aides report that Attorney General Griffin Bell, early this year, gave orders to the FBI to investigate activities of so-called "friendly intelligence services" in the United States. An investigation of allegations that the Iranian Embassy provided plane tickets and hotel rooms for pro-shah demonstrators in Washington in November 1977 is under way. If the allegations are true, the activity would be prosecutable under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

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Now you see him. The elusive man in the white suit is Mansur Rafizadeh, who heads SAVAK operations in the United States. In the top-left photo, he has just emerged from his car at the Iranian Embassy in Washington, body guard following. In second photo, top right, Rafizadeh has been twirled around by the bodyguard and another aide. They had spotted New York's photographer across the street. In the next three pictures, Rafizadeh conducted some business—taking papers from a proffered briefcase—with out turning around. He then dashed into the embassy residence a few steps away, keeping his back to the camera. Photo inset at right is the only known picture of Rafizadeh full on; it is his "official" photo, on file with the U.S. State Department.

